Community Association Law Reporter

Maria Elena DiBella, a member of the Half Moon Bay Homeowners Association in Croton, N.Y., sued the board after it either failed to respond to her requests to access certain documents or denied those requests on the ground that they did not pertain to the board's books and records.  

This case was a hybrid proceeding, combining both a special legal action to challenge the board’s decision and a standard lawsuit. Initially, the trial court dismissed three of the petitioner's claims (called "causes of action") at the request of the board, including her main claim requesting access to records. DiBella appealed this dismissal. 

On appeal, the higher court ruled that the trial court should not have dismissed the petitioner's first claim. That claim was based on her right as a board member to inspect the association’s books and records. The court reaffirmed that directors of corporations — and by extension, members of a homeowners association board — have an absolute right to see company records so they can carry out their duties responsibly and be informed. 

The court found that there were factual disputes about what records had been given and whether others were wrongly withheld. As a result, the court reinstated the first cause of action and sent it back to the lower court for further proceedings. 

The dismissal of the third and fourth causes of action was upheld, and the petitioner’s other arguments were rejected. 

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Jehanna Francis, a homeowner in the Signature of Solon residential community in Solon, Ohio, wanted to build a fence on her property, which borders a golf course. The community is governed by a homeowners association and is subject to strict rules set out in legal documents, including a declaration, a code of regulations, and design review committee guidelines. These rules prohibit fences and other structures from being built within 20 feet of the golf course unless written approval is obtained from both the committee and the golf course property owner. 

Francis submitted an application to build her fence, but the association denied her request, citing the 20-foot restriction in the declaration. She filed a lawsuit challenging the decision, arguing that the rule was unreasonable, unfairly enforced, and that other similar fences had been allowed. 

The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the association, meaning that the court decided the case without a full trial, finding that there were no significant factual disputes, and the law clearly supported one side. The court found that the restriction was clearly written, enforceable, and that Francis was bound by it because she agreed to the community rules when she bought her home. 

Francis appealed to the Eighth District Court of Appeals of Ohio, arguing that the association acted unfairly and that the fence restriction was invalid. The appellate court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The appellate court emphasized that: 

• The restriction was valid and clearly written. 

• The 20-foot buffer zone served a legitimate purpose: preserving open space and views along the golf course. 

• The association’s enforcement of the restriction was consistent with its documents. 

• Francis failed to prove that she was treated differently from other residents in a way that violated the law. 

Therefore, the association’s decision to deny the fence was upheld.  

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The Linda F. Slavick Trust owned two adjacent lots in Christmas Lake Properties Association in Santa Claus, Ind. The lots, located near the lake, border a parcel called Tract B, which is owned by the association and includes a portion of the lake and several shared-use docks. 

The covenant governing Tract B and the subject dock provided that: 

Each lot owner adjoining the water front shall have the exclusive right to use and enjoy the land laying between the lot line and the lake shore line; provided, however, that the rights hereby granted … shall not conflict with and shall be subordinate to the rights of the association to do all things necessary, or desirable, to protect, preserve and maintain the lake and said water front and lake shore area. 

Since purchasing the lots in 2008, Slavick used and maintained a dock located on Tract B and began treating the area as private property. In 2020, Slavick attempted to restrict others from using the dock and surrounding land by installing poles, a chain, and decorative lights. The association removed the obstructions, asserting that Tract B was common property accessible to all association members. 

In response, Slavick filed a lawsuit, asserting claims of: 

• Trespass (due to the association’s entry onto the disputed area) 

• Conversion (for removing physical items like poles and chains) 

• Breach of covenants 

• Declaratory judgment (seeking to declare the lots as waterfront with exclusive rights 

• Equitable estoppel (arguing that the association allowed for the belief in exclusive rights 

• Unequal treatment (a statutory claim) 

The association countersued with its own claims of trespass, conversion, architectural rule violations, and a counter-declaration that the new lots were not waterfront lots. 

Slavick moved for partial summary judgment, asserting entitlement to exclusive waterfront rights. Although the association missed the original 30-day deadline to respond, the trial court allowed a late response. Ultimately, the trial court denied Slavick’s motion and instead granted the association’s cross-motion for summary judgment on all issues. The trial court found that the new lots were not waterfront under the covenants and that Slavick was not entitled to exclusive use of the disputed dock or surrounding land. 

On appeal, the Indiana Court of Appeals addressed five main issues: 

1. Statutory notice: The court ruled that the association waived its objection about Slavick failing to give pre-lawsuit notice under Indiana law, since the association had actively litigated the case for over three years. 

2. Summary judgment procedure: Although the trial court wrongly allowed the association to respond late, the appellate court found Slavick’s initial summary judgment motion lacked necessary evidence, such as the subdivision plat showing the property’s boundaries; the denial stood. 

3. Waterfront rights interpretation: The court found the new lots did not directly adjoin the lake; Tract B lay in between. Thus, under the covenants, Slavick was not a “waterfront” owner and had no exclusive rights to the dock or lakefront area. 

4. Judicial taking: The court rejected the Landowner’s argument that denying exclusive rights amounted to a judicial taking, finding no property rights had been taken since none existed under the covenants. 

5. Architectural review: The court reversed the association’s win on this claim, holding that Tract B was not a “lot” under the covenants, so architectural rules didn’t apply to the Landowner’s installation of poles and a chain. 

The central issue on appeal was whether Slavick’s lots were “waterfront lots” within the meaning of the covenant at issue granting waterfront rights to the lot owner. In looking at the covenant, “waterfront” and “adjoining” were undefined, so the court turned to its ordinary meanings. The ordinary meaning of “waterfront” was “land, land with buildings, or a section of a town fronting or abutting on a body of water.” Additionally, the ordinary meaning of “adjoining” was “touching or bounding at a point or line.” Thus, the court concluded that Slavick would be entitled to the exclusive use and enjoyment of the disputed area only if the owner established that (1) the lots shared a common boundary with the lake and (2) the disputed areas was “land between the lot line and the lake shore line.”  

Slavick argued for a different interpretation of the covenant: entitlement to the use and enjoyment of the land lying between the lot line and the lake shore line, and that if the lot actually adjoined the lake, then there would not no such land lying between the lot line and the lake. In making this argument, however, Slavick conceded that the lot did not adjoin the waterfront, but it instead abuts Tract B. Thus, because the lots did not share a common boundary with the waterfront, the lots did not “adjoin” the waterfront under the meaning of the covenant, and Slavick did not have exclusive rights to use and enjoy the disputed area. 

The appellate court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case. Slavick lost on the core waterfront ownership issue but won on the architectural review counterclaim. The matter was sent back to the trial court to reflect that decision. 

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Vermillion Shores Athletic Club Owners Association in Lorain County, Ohio, filed a foreclosure action against Shoreline Village Apartments, claiming unpaid assessments for the use of common amenities such as a clubhouse, pool, and tennis courts used by Shoreline’s tenants.  

The association based its foreclosure action under CC&Rs that were recorded in 2003. Shoreline denied liability, counterclaimed for declaratory and injunctive relief, and argued that the declaration was not in its chain of title — a necessary condition under Ohio law for constructive notice, which is required to legally bind a property owner to association rules. Shoreline moved for summary judgment, asserting that it was not legally part of the association and that the association had no right to collect assessments or place liens on its property. 

The trial court disagreed and granted summary judgment in favor of the association, finding that Shoreline had actual and constructive notice of the association and had demonstrated intent to be bound by its governing documents. The court also faulted Shoreline’s expert report, calling it too narrow, and emphasized Shoreline’s conduct, such as allowing tenants to use the association’s facilities and participating in owners’ meetings. 

The Ninth District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court found that the trial court had improperly blended legal standards by treating the summary judgment motion as if it were a motion to dismiss (under Civil Rule 12(B)(6)), which is evaluated based on assumed facts from pleadings, rather than applying the correct summary judgment standard under Civil Rule 56(C), which requires viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. 

Because of this procedural error, the appellate court sustained Shoreline’s first assignment of error and remanded the case for further proceedings under the correct legal standard. 

The court’s ruling means that: 

• Constructive notice through recorded covenants in the chain of title is required to enforce association rules. 

• Actual knowledge or conduct (such as using amenities) does not override this requirement. 

• Courts must apply the proper standard (Rule 56) when ruling on summary judgment motions. 

• Association membership and assessment obligations cannot be compelled absent proper title-based notice. 

The appellate court did not reach a final ruling on the merits and returned the case to the trial court for proper reconsideration. 

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