Evelyn Burton and Michael Burton as trustees of the EB Trust (“Plaintiffs”) filed suit against Chase Point Unit Owner’s Association (“the Association”), Richard Steinwurtzel, president of the Association, and Jan Preston, Chair of the Mechanical Systems Committee, in 2020. The case was brought in the District of Columbia Superior Court.
Plaintiffs submitted an application to install charging equipment for an electric vehicle in a parking space licensed to the unit Plaintiffs own through the EB Trust. Plaintiffs claimed that the Defendants denied their application in a manner that infringed on their rights to install charging equipment. Plaintiffs also alleged that Steinwurtzel and Preston breached their fiduciary duties in denying the Plaintiffs’ application.
The Association had denied the application, which initially was submitted prior to Plaintiff’s acquisition of the Unit, because it was in the process of developing a procedure for owners to submit an application seeking approval for an electronic vehicle charging station in its parking garage, and the Plaintiff’s proposed approach did not comply with the Association’s planned procedures, which were designed to ensure that the Association had sufficient electrical capacity to handle the additional load from EV charging stations and to ensure that electrical wiring from the Association’s electrical room to the limited common element parking spaces was installed in a manner that was safe and not unsightly.
Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment regarding their right to install electric vehicle charging equipment and damages and injunctive relief against Steinwurtzel and Preston for breaching their fiduciary duties to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs also brought additional claims for damages and injunctive relief against the Association for violating D.C. Code § 42-19.2.09(a), breach of contract, and intentional interference with property rights.
Prior to trial, the Court dismissed the breach of fiduciary duty claims, as well as a claim for inspection of the books and records. The remainder of the claims proceeded to trial. At trial, the jury awarded Plaintiffs $4,000 for their statutory claim under D.C. Code § 42-19.2.09(a). However, this was only a quarter of the $16,000 that Plaintiffs had sought in damages. The jury ruled in favor of the Association on the breach of contract and intentional interference with property rights claims. Significantly, the Court entered judgment in favor of the Association on the declaratory judgment claim, thereby prohibiting the Plaintiffs from installing their own electric car charger in the common elements.
After trial, the Plaintiffs submitted a motion for recovery of attorney’s fees, contending that they were the substantially prevailing party under D.C. Code § 42-19.2.09(a). In the petition, the Plaintiffs requested $594,904.50 in fees and $26,380.73 in costs. The Association also submitted a motion for the recovery of attorney’s fees.
Ultimately, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion but reduced the fee award to $68,106.36 and $26,380.73 in costs. The Court denied the Association’s motion for recovery of attorney’s fees, even though the Association had prevailed on over six of the seven claims brought by the Plaintiffs, including the declaratory judgment claim. In so doing, the Court interpreted the “substantially prevailing party” language in D.C. Code § 42-19.2.09(a) to be the same as a prevailing party. While the Court acknowledged that the law was unsettled on the meaning of a substantially prevailing party, the Court relied in D.C. Court of Appeals cases finding that a party succeeding on one of its claims is a prevailing party, thereby allowing the Court to award fees to the Plaintiffs.
The Association contends that the trial court erred in ignoring the word “substantially.” Prior to the amendment of D.C. Code § 42-1902.09 in 2014, which added the fee-shifting provision to the “substantially prevailing party,” the law was clear that a “prevailing party” is one that “succeeded on only some of his claims for relief.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983) (emphasis added). Thus, in clarifying that a party must prevail “substantially” to recover under § 42-1902.09, the D.C. Council presumptively rejected the notion that a party can recover fees merely by obtaining “some” relief.
In advancing the argument that a prevailing party is different from a substantially prevailing party, the Association relied on case law outside of the jurisdiction. In Bridges PBT v. Chatta, 2003 PA Super 122, P10 (2003), the Superior Court of Pennsylvania reached the same conclusion. In interpreting the mean of “substantially prevailing party,” the court reasoned as follows:
“We presume that the legislature intended that the entire statute be effective and disfavors surplusage. . . . [T]he highlighted language makes clear, an arbitrator is required to award attorney fees and expenses only to a substantially prevailing party. [Plaintiff] would read this provision as requiring an award simply because it was the “prevailing party.” [Plaintiff] would have us write out the modifier “substantially.” This we may not do.”
After finding that the plaintiff only received 40% of the damages it sought, the Chatta court concluded that the plaintiff was not the “substantially prevailing party.”
Similar to Chatta, the Court, in this case, should have ruled that the Association was the substantially prevailing party. Given the Court’s ruling, the issue of recovery of attorney’s fees is of significance to condominiums in the District of Columbia. The amendment to the statute was designed to award fees to an association that prevails over most of the claims brought by an owner so that in a situation such as this, where the Association clearly prevailed, the Association would be entitled to recovery of attorney’s fees.
This is an important issue pertaining to the interpretation of the DC Condominium Act. The CAI District of Columbia Legislative Action Committee lobbied for the “substantially prevailing party” language when the Condominium Act was amended in 2014 to address exactly this type of situation where an association is successful in defending against a number of counts in a lawsuit but does not prevail on a minor count. The DC Superior Court clearly errored in ignoring the word “substantially”, which violates the clear language of the statute. Associations are frequently subjected to defending multiple claims brought by owners and the amendment to the statute was designed to avoid situations where an owner prevails on a small fraction of its claim and is awarded fees. If the Court had properly analyzed the definition of substantially prevailing party, future owners would be deterred from bringing frivolous claims against their associations.
Amicus Brief
Court: D.C. Court of Appeals
Topic: Substantially prevailing parties
Brief Author: Cary Devorsetz, Esq., of Alderman, Devorsetz & Hora, PLLC, and Brendan Bunn, Esq., CCAL, and Michael Gartner, Esq., of Chadwick, Washington, Moriarty, Elmore & Bunn, P.C.
Filed: August 27, 2025
CAI Amicus Review Panel:
Mr. Robert Diamond, Esq., CCAL, Co-Chair of Amicus Committee (VA)
Mr. Edmund Allcock, Esq., CCAL, Co-Chair of Amicus Committee (MA)
Ms. Lisa Magill, Esq., CCAL, Co-Chair of Amicus Committee (FL)
Mr. Scott Weiss, Esq., CCAL, CCAL BOG Liaison (TN)
Mr. Gabriella Comstock, Esq., CCAL (IL)
Mr. Christopher Gelwicks, Esq. (NC)
Ms. Jonathan Katz, Esq. (NJ)