Restricting Smoking In A Community Association

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Smoking and the use of marijuana continue to challenge community associations, especially in communities seeking to restrict or ban the practice. These are challenging issues given the fact-specific nature of the claims and the inconsistency in the laws that apply. As such, the decisions and verdicts of judges and juries across the Country vary dramatically, depending on the type of smoke, the origin of the smoke, smoking frequency, and the community association’s involvement (if any) in the dispute. This article will highlight several theories that can aid in restricting smoking in a community association. This article will also cover risk management approaches and issues surrounding marijuana use in a community association and whether a community association is obligated to grant accommodations to medical marijuana users.

A. How Can Smoking Be Prevented In A Community Association?

Many communities are struggling with residents that smoke and how that smoke impacts other residents. Absent a blanket prohibition on smoking in the governing documents, can a community association take action to stop smoking? Most community association lawyers agree that at least in some situations, a community association may take action to prevent smoking and the production of secondhand smoke. This can be accomplished under a number of legal theories, including nuisance and nuisance per se.

1. Is Smoking A Nuisance?

The most basic theory that may provide relief to a community association (or owner) is a private nuisance claim. A private nuisance is the unreasonable use of one’s property in a manner that substantially interferes with the use of another individual’s property. Said another way, a nuisance is an act, object, or practice that interferes with another’s rights or interests by being offensive, annoying, dangerous, obstructive, or unhealthful.

State statutes vary on how a nuisance is defined; however, the statutes often contain broad language that is flexible in terms of how it can be applied and what activities are covered. Given this, smoking can constitute a nuisance, depending on the circumstances. Recent medical studies and investigations into the effects of smoking and second-hand smoking demonstrate that tobacco smoke can be dangerous to a person. The smoke can also migrate and transfer through walls, vents and airspaces. Thus, smoking can be actionable as a nuisance.

That said, to what degree can smoking be deemed to be a nuisance? If a neighbor smokes one cigarette per day and the migration of smoke from that cigarette is minimal, is that going to be considered a nuisance? What about 5 cigarettes per day from a balcony or patio?

Obviously, the migration or transfer of smoke is dependent on a number of different factors, including the location of the smoker, the components of the property, the type of cigarette or cigar, the type of tobacco, and the ventilation surrounding the smoker. Thus, community association boards should investigate
smoking complaints, and only after a full investigation of the facts should the board make a decision regarding how the community association should proceed. What could constitute a nuisance in one community may not be a nuisance in another community - every claim is fact-specific.

2. **Can A Nuisance Per Se Claim Be Of Any Help To Community Associations?**

Some activities are automatically deemed to be a nuisance pursuant to statute or ordinance - this is called a nuisance per se. Activities or conduct declared by law to be nuisances are nuisances per se, and may be enjoined without proof of their injurious nature. Therefore, if a statute or ordinance specifically states that smoking is a nuisance, then the community association could proceed on a nuisance per se theory and seek injunctive relief and/or damages without having to prove that a nuisance exists. For example, the City of Menlo Park (a city located in the San Francisco Bay area) passed Chapter 7.30, which declares secondhand smoke to be a nuisance. Thus, establishing a nuisance per se by virtue of a statute or ordinance creates a short-cut for community associations seeking to prevent smoking.

Counsel for the community association should pay close attention to the language of the ordinance or statute as well as the elements of nuisance per se for their state. If the statute or ordinance merely states that smoking is illegal (as opposed to specifically declaring it to be a nuisance), the community association may not be able to rely on a nuisance per se theory. Be mindful that jurisdictions vary on this point and how nuisance per se is defined. If smoking is characterized as a nuisance per se, this can be a powerful tool for the community association attempting to stop an owner’s smoking without a smoking ban in the governing documents.

3. **The Governing Documents As A Tool**

Obviously, if the community association's governing documents ban smoking in the common area, then the association can take action to prevent owners from smoking in the common areas. But what if the governing documents fail to address the issue of smoking? Are there provisions in the governing documents that could be helpful? The declaration of covenants oftentimes contains a nuisance provision that prohibits any illegal activity or any violations or the local laws or ordinances.

For example, the declaration may state:

No Owner shall engage in any nuisance or **any illegal**, noxious, or offensive activity in any part of the Development, or do any act which unreasonably threatens the health, safety and welfare of other residents of the Development, or which is or may become a nuisance or cause unreasonable embarrassment, disturbance or annoyance to other Owners in the use and enjoyment of their Units or of the Common Area.

While noxious and offensive activities are open to interpretation and argument, an illegal activity can be easily identified. That is, if a local ordinance prohibits smoking, the community association could enforce the declaration based upon the illegal activity (i.e., smoking). Thus, the “illegal” activity - here, smoking - could be deemed to be a nuisance by virtue of the restrictions in the declaration of covenants.

4. **Amending The Governing Documents**

Can a board-imposed smoking ban be applied to an owner’s balcony or patio? Interestingly, a balcony or patio is defined in a number of different ways. The condominium plan, map, deed or declaration can dictate the property rights associated with such a space. So long as the balcony or patio is not characterized as the owner’s separate interest, a community association is likely able to impose such a
nonsmoking ban by amending the rules and regulations. That said, while - legally speaking - a board of directors may impose this type of rule unilaterally, the board should solicit feedback from the membership anytime a significant and potentially controversial rule is being considered. To the extent a rule seeks to regulate an owner’s private space - regardless of how it is defined in the governing documents, the membership should be advised about the proposed change and have an opportunity to provide comments and concerns to the board before a final decision is made.

5. Risk Management

The above assumes that the community association desires to restrict smoking and seek to enforce those restrictions. Even in communities that wish to not get involved in smoking disputes, a community association’s involvement may be unavoidable in disputes between neighbors that deal with secondhand smoke. At the very least, community associations need to evaluate whether the dispute involves a violation of the governing documents and requires enforcement. If the community association skips this step, it could be exposing itself to liability.

For example, in Chauncey v. Bella Palermo Homeowners Association (case no. 30-2011-00461681), a jury in Orange County, California returned a verdict holding Bella Palermo HOA responsible for second-hand cigarette smoke exposure to a condominium resident owner. In the lawsuit, the plaintiff alleged that they repeatedly complained to the homeowners association and the property manager about second hand smoke from the tenants in the adjoining unit. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, and also found the association in breach of the CC&Rs, despite the CC&Rs not specifically prohibiting smoking at the project. The CC&R’s did contain a “nuisance” provision and other provisions requiring the association to ensure the owners were entitled to the “quiet enjoyment” of their unit. While the association was liable for minimal damages, the trial judge awarded plaintiffs $54,000 against the association.

Thus, the first step should be for the association board to investigate the dispute and the allegations. The board should consider conducting a hearing or meeting with the parties involved to determine whether the dispute can be resolved amicably, and if not, whether a legitimate violation of the governing documents exists. The Chauncey verdict illustrates how associations cannot simply ignore the dispute. If the dispute is ignored and the community association fails to take action, such approach may result in a significant monetary award against the association, not to mention the amount of time, money, expense, and headache of defending a lawsuit.

B. Marijuana Smoke And Reasonable Accommodation Requests

Despite Federal law, many states have enacted statutes allowing the distribution and use of marijuana, either medically or recreationally. One issue that continues to challenge the community association legal community is whether a community association is required to provide a reasonable accommodation to an owner who has acquired the legal (State) right to use medical marijuana based on a medical need.

1. The HUD Memorandum

On January 20, 2011, the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) issued a memorandum addressing the medical use of marijuana and reasonable accommodation in Federal Public and Assisted Housing. One issue addressed in the opinion is whether a Public Housing Agency (PHA) is required to grant a reasonable accommodation to a disabled person to use medical marijuana. HUD opined that PHAs are not required to grant such an accommodation because marijuana is characterized as a Schedule I substance under the Controlled Substance Act. (21 U.S.C., §§801, et seq.) The manufacture, distribution, or possession or marijuana is a federal offense, and it may not be legally
prescribed by a physician for any reason. Moreover, persons seeking an accommodation to use medical marijuana are not “individuals with a disability” under Section 504 and the ADA.

By analogy, the same logic should be applied to community associations. If an owner requests that his or her community association grant a reasonable accommodation to use marijuana pursuant to State law, the applicant owner would not be entitled to a reasonable accommodation to use marijuana because it is still an illegal drug that cannot be prescribed.

2. Employment Context

Courts have taken a similar stance in employment cases. The ADA specifically excludes “psychoactive substance abuse disorders” resulting from current illegal use of drugs. (42 USC §§12114(a), 12111(6)(A), 12210, 12211(b)(3); see also 29 CFR, §1630.3(a),(d),(e); EEOC Compliance Manual, §902.6.) Thus, the ADA does not protect employees currently using illegal drugs if their drug-induced disorders could otherwise be considered a disability. (42 USC §12114(a); see Zenor v. El Paso Healthcare System, Ltd. (5th Cir. 1999) 176 F3d 847, 853.)

Likewise, even if physician-prescribed marijuana use is permitted by California law, because it is prohibited by federal law, it is an “illegal use of drugs” for ADA purposes and falls within the ADA’s illegal drug exclusion. (James v. City of Costa Mesa (9th Cir. 2012) 684 F3d 825, 836 - “We hold that doctor-recommended marijuana use permitted by state law, but prohibited by federal law, is an illegal use of drugs for purposes of the ADA, and that the plaintiffs’ federally proscribed medical marijuana use therefore brings them within the ADA’s illegal drug exclusion.”)

Although marijuana use for medical purposes is exempt from certain criminal statutes (see Health & Saf.C. §§ 11362.5, 11362.83), it remains a crime under federal law. Employers are therefore protected in firing or refusing to hire persons who use marijuana or test positive for marijuana use, even when the use was prescribed by a physician to alleviate a disability: “The FEHA does not require employers to accommodate the use of illegal drugs.” (Ross v. Raging–Wire Telecommunications, Inc. (2008) 42 Cal.4th 920, 926.)

On this same theme, no state law could completely legalize marijuana for medical purposes because the drug remains illegal under federal law (Ross v. RagingWire Telecommunications, Inc. (2008) 42 Cal. 4th 920, 926, citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 812, 844(a)), even for medical users (see Gonzales v. Raich, supra, 545 U.S. 1, 26-29; United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative, supra, 532 U.S. 483, 491-495.)

3. The Maine Human Rights Commission

On May 21, 2012, the Maine Human Rights Commission issued a memorandum dealing with whether a landlord was required to grant a reasonable accommodation (i.e., use of medical marijuana) to a tenant under the Maine Human Rights Act. The Advisory Opinion relied upon the HUD’s January 20, 2011 memorandum and found that the landlord was not required to grant such an accommodation because marijuana is illegal under federal law. Presumably, this same logic may be extended to the community association industry. That is, to the extent a community association implements a smoking prohibition that includes marijuana, the community association would not be required to grant a reasonable accommodation to a petitioning owner because marijuana is illegal and would not qualify as an “individual with a disability.”
MEMORANDUM FOR: John Trasviña, Assistant Secretary for Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity
David Stevens, Assistant Secretary for Housing/ Federal Housing Commissioner
Sandra B. Henriquez, Assistant Secretary for Public and Indian Housing

FROM: Helen R. Kanovsky

SUBJECT: Medical Use of Marijuana and Reasonable Accommodation in Federal Public and Assisted Housing.

I. Introduction

The Office of Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity (FHEO) requested our opinion as to whether Public Housing Agencies (PHAs) and owners of other federally assisted housing may grant current or prospective residents a reasonable accommodation under federal or state nondiscrimination laws for the use of medical marijuana. Commensurate with the relatively recent upsurge of states passing medical marijuana laws, there has been a significant increase in the number of requests by residents of those states for exceptions to federal drug-free laws and policies to permit the use of medical marijuana as a reasonable accommodation for their disabilities. In 1999, this Office issued a Memorandum concluding that any state law purporting to legalize the use of medical marijuana in public or other assisted housing would conflict with the admission and termination standards found in the Quality Housing and Work and Responsibility Act of 1998 (QHWRA) and be subject to preemption. With this Memorandum, we reaffirm the Laster Memorandum’s conclusions, and we address those conclusions in the context of requests for reasonable accommodation under federal and state nondiscrimination laws.

As discussed below, federal and state nondiscrimination laws do not require PHAs and owners of other federally assisted housing to accommodate requests by current or prospective

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1 For purposes of this Memorandum, “medical marijuana” refers to marijuana authorized by state medical marijuana laws, and the “use” of medical marijuana encompasses the use, unlawful possession, manufacture, and distribution of marijuana, as prohibited by the Controlled Substances Act. See infra Section III.B.2.
3 See Sept. 24, 1999 Memorandum from Gail W. Laster, General Counsel, to William C. Apgar, Assistant Secretary, Office of Housing/Federal Housing Commissioner, and Harold Lucas, Assistant Secretary for Public and Indian Housing, on “Medical use of marijuana in public housing” [hereinafter Laster Memorandum] (attached).
residents with disabilities to use medical marijuana. In fact, PHAs and owners may not permit the use of medical marijuana as a reasonable accommodation because: 1) persons who are currently using illegal drugs, including medical marijuana, are categorically disqualified from protection under the disability definition provisions of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act; and 2) such accommodations are not reasonable under the Fair Housing Act because they would constitute a fundamental alteration in the nature of a PHA or owner’s operations. Accordingly, PHAs and owners may not grant requests by current or prospective residents to use medical marijuana as a reasonable accommodation for their disabilities, and FHEO investigators should not issue determinations of reasonable cause to believe a PHA or owner has violated the Fair Housing Act based solely on the denial of a request to use medical marijuana as a reasonable accommodation.

While PHAs and owners may not grant reasonable accommodations for medical marijuana use, they maintain the discretion either to evict or refrain from evicting current residents who engage in such use, as set forth in QWHRA. See infra, Section V.

II. Background

A. Federal Drug Laws

Marijuana is categorized as a Schedule I substance under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). See 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. The manufacture, distribution, or possession of marijuana is a federal criminal offense, and it may not be legally prescribed by a physician for any reason. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1); 844(a); 812(b)(1)(A)-(C).

B. State Medical Marijuana Laws

Since 1996, fifteen states and the District of Columbia have enacted laws that allow certain medical uses of marijuana despite the federal prohibition against its use. Rather than permitting physicians to prescribe marijuana, these laws allow physicians to discuss the benefits and drawbacks of marijuana when determining whether to “recommend” it or “certify” that the patient qualifies for it under the medical conditions listed in the state statute. These state laws offer qualifying patients narrow exemptions from prosecution and/or arrest under state—but not federal—laws. The laws vary in how they protect medical marijuana users from state criminal laws, but all share the following features: 1) exemptions from arrest and/or prosecution for patients and caregivers who grow, possess, and use marijuana in conjunction with a doctor’s “recommendation” or “certification”; 2) rules governing the caregiver’s role in the procurement and administration of medical marijuana to the patient; 3) documentation requirements; and 4) quantitative limits on marijuana possession, cultivation, and usage.

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C. Federal Admission and Termination Standards under QHWRA

Section 576(b) of QHWRA addresses admissions standards related to current illegal drug use for all public housing and other federally assisted housing. Pursuant to that section, PHAs or owners shall establish standards that prohibit admission to the program or admission to federally assisted housing for any household with a member – (A) who the public housing agency or owner determines is illegally using a controlled substance; or (B) with respect to whom the public housing agency or owner determines that it has reasonable cause to believe that such household member’s illegal use (or pattern of illegal use) of a controlled substance . . . may interfere with the health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other residents.


QHWRA therefore requires PHAs and owners to deny admission to those households with a member who the PHA or owner determines is, at the time of consideration for admission, illegally using a “controlled substance” as that term is defined by the CSA. See Laster Memorandum at 2-3 & n.4. The Laster Memorandum advised that to determine whether an applicant is using a controlled substance at the time of consideration for admission, the use of the drug must have occurred recently enough to warrant a reasonable belief that the use is ongoing. See id. at 3-4. This requires a highly individualized, fact-specific examination of all relevant circumstances. Id. at 4.

In contrast, under QHWRA’s termination standards, PHAs and owners have the discretion to evict, or refrain from evicting, a current tenant who the PHA or owner determines is illegally using a controlled substance. PHAs or owners must establish standards or lease provisions that allow the agency or owner (as applicable) to terminate the tenancy or assistance for any household with a member – (1) who the public housing agency or owner determines is illegally using a controlled substance; or (2) whose illegal use (or pattern of illegal use) of a controlled substance . . . is determined by the public housing agency or owner to interfere with the health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other residents.


Thus, while PHAs and owners may elect to terminate occupancy based on illegal drug use, they are not required to evict current tenants for such use. See Laster Memorandum at 6-7. Further, PHAs and owners may not establish lease provisions or policies that affirmatively permit occupancy by medical marijuana users because doing so would divest PHAs and owners of the very discretion which Congress intended for them to exercise. See id. at 6. As with admission standards, the use of the illegal controlled substance must have occurred recently enough to warrant a reasonable belief that the use is ongoing.
III. Federal nondiscrimination laws do not require PHAs and owners to allow marijuana use as a reasonable accommodation for disabilities.

The Fair Housing Act, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (Section 504), and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) prohibit, among other things, discrimination against persons with disabilities in public housing and other federally assisted housing. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (f)(1)-(3); 29 U.S.C. § 794(a); 42 U.S.C. § 12132. One type of disability discrimination prohibited by all three statutes is the refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, and practices when such accommodations are necessary to provide the person with disabilities with the full opportunity to enjoy a dwelling, service, program or activity.\(^6\)

To establish discrimination for failure to accommodate a disability, a plaintiff must prove the following elements: 1) the plaintiff meets the statute’s definition of “disability” or “handicap”; 2) the accommodation is necessary to afford him or her an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling (Fair Housing Act) or is necessary to avoid discrimination against him or her in the public service, activity, or program (Section 504 and ADA); 3) the plaintiff actually requests an accommodation; 4) the accommodation is reasonable; and 5) the defendant refused to make the required accommodation.\(^7\) The relevant elements for purposes of this Memorandum are the first and fourth: whether a medical marijuana user falls within the definition of “disability” or “handicap,” and whether an accommodation allowing the use of medical marijuana is reasonable in the context of public housing or other federally assisted housing.

A. Under Section 504 and the ADA, current illegal drug users, including medical marijuana users, are excluded from the definition of “individual with a disability” when the provider acts on the basis of the illegal drug use.

An individual must be disabled to be entitled to a reasonable accommodation. Although medical marijuana users may meet this standard because of the underlying medical conditions for which they use or seek to use marijuana, Section 504 and the ADA categorically exempt current illegal drug users from their definitions of “disability” when the covered entity acts on the basis of such use:

[T]he term “individual with a disability” does not include an individual who is currently engaging in the illegal use of drugs, when the covered entity acts on the basis of such use.\(^8\)

1. “Illegal” use of drugs

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\(^6\) 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (f)(3)(B) (“discrimination includes . . . a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling”); 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (“[a] public entity shall make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity”); Alexander v. Chao, 469 U.S. 287, 301 (1985) (Section 504 requires recipients of federal financial assistance to provide reasonable accommodations to disabled persons).

\(^7\) See, e.g., Joint Statement of HUD and the Department of Justice, “Reasonable Accommodations Under the Fair Housing Act,” at question 12 [hereinafter “Joint Statement”].

Under Section 504 and the ADA, whether a given drug or usage is “illegal” is determined exclusively by reference to the CSA. See 29 U.S.C. § 705(10)(A)-(B); 42 U.S.C. §12110(d)(1). Because the CSA prohibits all forms of marijuana use, the use of medical marijuana is “illegal” under federal law even if it is permitted under state law. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1); 844(a); 812(b)(1)(A)-(C).

While Section 504 and the ADA contain language providing a physician-supervision exemption to the “current illegal drug user” exclusionary provisions, this exemption does not apply to medical marijuana users. The ADA’s physician-exemption language, which mirrors Section 504, states:

The term ‘illegal use of drugs’ means the use of drugs, the possession or distribution of which is unlawful under the Controlled Substances Act . . . . Such term does not include the use of a drug taken under supervision by a licensed health care professional, or other uses authorized by the Controlled Substances Act . . . or other provisions of Federal law.\footnote{42 U.S.C. § 12211(d)(1); see also 29 U.S.C. § 705(10)(B) (Section 504). Similarly, the Fair Housing Act House Report states that the “current illegal drug user” exclusionary provision in that law “does not eliminate protection for individuals who take drugs defined in the Controlled Substances Act for a medical condition under the care of, or prescription from, a physician.” H.R. Rep. No. 100-711, at 22 (1988), reprinted in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2183.}

Because the phrase “supervision by a licensed health care professional” is modified by the subsequent phrase “or other uses authorized by the Controlled Substances Act,” the exemption applies only to those uses that are sanctioned by the CSA. See Barber v. Gonzales, 2005 WL 1607189, at *1 (E.D. Wash. July 1, 2005); James v. City of Costa Mesa, 2010 WL 1848157, at *4 (C.D. Cal. April 30, 2010). Accordingly, because medical marijuana use violates the CSA, medical marijuana users are excluded from the definition of “individual with a disability” under Section 504 and the ADA, regardless of whether state laws authorize such use. Barber, 2005 WL 1607189, at *2.

2. Acting “on the basis of such use”

Section 504 and the ADA’s exclusion of “current illegal drug users” applies to current medical marijuana users only when the PHA or owner is acting on the basis of that current use: “[T]he term ‘individual with a disability’ does not include an individual who is currently engaging in the illegal use of drugs, when the covered entity acts on the basis of such use.” 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(C)(i); 42 U.S.C. § 12210(a) (emphasis added); see also 28 C.F.R. § 35.131(a)(1) (“this part does not prohibit discrimination against an individual based on that individual’s current illegal use of drugs.”)(emphasis added).

A housing provider is acting on the basis of current drug use, when, for example, the provider evicts a tenant for violating the provider’s drug-free policies. In that context, the tenant, even if suffering from a serious impairment such as cancer or multiple sclerosis, would not be “disabled” under the ADA or Section 504 for purposes of filing a claim under those laws challenging the eviction as disability discrimination. See, e.g., Blatch v. Hernandez, 360 F. Supp.
2d 595, 634 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (concluding that otherwise disabled public housing residents with mental illnesses are not considered disabled if a provider evicts them based on their current illegal drug use). A tenant who has a disabling impairment and is a current illegal drug user could, however, bring a claim under the ADA or Section 504 for disability discrimination where the housing provider evicted the tenant because the tenant asked to have grab bars installed in the shower. In that case, the provider would not have acted on the basis of the illegal drug use, but because the tenant requested grab bars.

For the same reason, an otherwise disabled tenant – a tenant with cancer, for example – is not “disabled” under the ADA or Section 504 for purposes of challenging a housing provider’s refusal to grant a tenant’s request for a reasonable accommodation to use medical marijuana as a cancer treatment. In denying the cancer patient’s request to use medical marijuana because it is an illegal drug, the housing provider would have been acting on the basis of current illegal drug use.\(^{10}\)

Courts have specifically addressed this drug-use exclusion in medical marijuana cases, finding that otherwise disabled plaintiffs were excluded from protection under Section 504 and the ADA when housing entities took actions against them based on their use of medical marijuana. For example, one court rejected an ADA claim from a student with serious lower back problems who had requested an accommodation to use medical marijuana in a state university housing facility. See *Barber v. Gonzales*, 2005 WL 1607189, at *1 (E.D. Wash. July 1, 2005). The court noted that “a federal claim under the ADA does not exist because the term ‘individual with a disability’ does not include an individual who is currently engaging in the illegal use of drugs when the covered entity acted on the basis of such use.” *Id.* (emphasis added).

In another case, a medical marijuana user requested an accommodation to a PHA’s drug-free policy that would allow him to continue using and cultivating marijuana in his unit. See *Assenberg v. Anacortes Hous. Auth.*, 2006 WL 1515603, at *2 (W.D. Wash., May 25, 2006), aff’d, 268 Fed.Appx. 643 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 104 (2008). The court concluded that although the tenant had a “debilitating” back injury, “because [he] was an illegal drug user, [the PHA] had no duty to accommodate him.” 2006 WL 1515603 at *2, *5. The court of appeals affirmed and — with no analysis — stated that the ADA and Section 504 “expressly exclude illegal drug use” and “[the PHA] did not have a duty to reasonably accommodate [the plaintiffs’] medical marijuana use.” *Assenberg*, 268 Fed. Appx. at 643; see also *Blatch v. Hernandez*, 360 F. Supp. 2d at 634 (finding that, in the context of general illegal drug use in public housing, under Section 504 and the ADA “the mentally disabled status of a current illegal drug user against whom action is taken based on that drug use . . . is [not] a viable basis for a claim that [the Housing Authority] is required to accommodate the disabled person by changing its generally-applicable rules.”).

Thus, persons seeking an accommodation to use medical marijuana are not “individuals with a disability” under Section 504 and the ADA and therefore do not qualify for reasonable accommodations that would allow for such use. Furthermore, because requests to use medical marijuana prospectively are tantamount to requests to become a “current illegal drug user,” PHAs are prohibited from granting such requests. However, current medical marijuana users are

\(^{10}\) We note that PHAs or owners that choose to exercise their discretion under QHWRA not to evict a current tenant for medical marijuana use may not later use this drug use as pretext for refusing to provide other, non-marijuana-related accommodations.
disqualified from protection under the ADA and Section 504 only when the housing provider takes actions based on that illegal drug use.

B. Though otherwise disabled medical marijuana users are not excluded from the Fair Housing Act’s definition of “handicap,” accommodations allowing for the use of medical marijuana in public housing or other federally assisted housing are not reasonable.

The Fair Housing Act’s illegal drug use exclusion is defined differently from the exclusion found in Section 504 and the ADA. Under the Fair Housing Act,

“Handicap” means, with respect to a person—

(1) a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person’s major life activities . . .

. . .

But such term does not include current, illegal use of or addiction to a controlled substance (as defined in Section 802 of Title 21 [CSA]).

Unlike the language in Section 504 and the ADA, this provision does not categorically exclude individuals from protection under the Fair Housing Act. Rather, it prevents a current illegal drug user or addict from asserting that the drug use or addiction is itself the basis for claiming that he or she is disabled under the Act. Thus, if a person claims that medical marijuana use or addiction is the sole condition for which that person seeks a reasonable accommodation, that individual is not “handicapped” within the meaning of the Fair Housing Act, and no duty arises to accommodate such use. However, a person who is otherwise disabled (e.g., cancer, multiple sclerosis) is not disqualified from the definition of “handicap” under the Act merely because the person is also a current illegal user of marijuana. Because persons suffering from underlying disabling conditions not related to drug use are not disqualified from the Fair Housing Act’s definition of “handicap” by virtue of their current medical marijuana use, we must examine whether accommodating such use is reasonable under the Act.

1. Accommodations allowing the use of medical marijuana in public housing or other federally assisted housing are not reasonable under the Fair Housing Act.

Under the Fair Housing Act and other civil rights statutes protecting persons with disabilities, an accommodation may be denied as not reasonable if either: 1) granting the

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11 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h) (emphasis added).
12 In Assenberrg v. Anacortes Hous. Auth., the trial court, with no analysis, determined that because the tenant was an illegal drug user, the PHA had no duty to accommodate him under the Fair Housing Act, the ADA, or Section 504. See 2006 WL 1515603, at *5. The court of appeals affirmed, stating only that the Fair Housing Act, the ADA, and Section 504 “all expressly exclude illegal drug use, and [the PHA] did not have a duty to accommodate [the tenant’s] medical marijuana use.” 268 Fed. Appx. at 644. Although the district court and the court of appeals, in unpublished opinions, each cited to the exclusionary provisions in the three statutes to support this conclusion, both courts failed to recognize the distinction between the statutory language in the Fair Housing Act, on the one hand, and the language in Section 504 and the ADA, on the other. See 2006 WL 1515603, at *5; 268 Fed. Appx. at 644.
accommodation would require a *fundamental alteration in the nature* of the housing provider’s operations; or 2) the requested accommodation imposes an *undue financial and administrative burden* on the housing provider. See, e.g., Joint Statement, *supra* note 7, at 3.

Accommodations that allow the use of medical marijuana would sanction violations of federal criminal law and thus constitute a fundamental alteration in the nature of the housing operation. Indeed, allowing such an accommodation would thwart a central programmatic goal of providing a safe living environment free from illegal drug use. Since the inception of the public housing program in 1937, Congress and HUD have consistently maintained that one of the primary concerns of public housing and other assisted housing programs is to provide “decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings for families of low income.” *United States Housing Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-412, 50 Stat. 888 (1937); 42 U.S.C. § 1437a(a)(5)(C)(b)(1); see also 24 C.F.R. § 880.101* (same with respect to Section 8 program). Congress has made it clear that providing drug-free housing is integral to the government’s responsibility in this regard: “[T]he Federal Government has a duty to provide public and other federally assisted low-income housing that is decent, safe, and *free from illegal drugs.*” *42 U.S.C. § 11901(1) (emphasis added).* Toward this end, Congress specifically vested PHAs and owners with the authority to take action against illegal drug use, including the use of medical marijuana. Illegal drug use renders the user ineligible for admission to public or other assisted housing, conflicts with drug-free standards that PHAs and owners are required to establish for current tenants, and would violate a user-tenant’s lease obligation to refrain from engaging in any drug-related criminal activity on or off the premises.

Although PHAs and owners are not charged with enforcing federal criminal laws, requiring them to condone violations of those laws would undermine a PHA or owner’s operations. In the public housing context, courts considering accommodations requiring PHAs to alter their drug-free policies to allow tenants with disabilities to use medical marijuana have found them unreasonable because they would have the perverse effect of mandating that PHAs violate federal law. See *Assenberg, 2006 WL 1515603, at *5 (“Reasonable’ accommodations do not include requiring [a PHA] to tolerate illegal drug use or risk losing its funding for doing so”); Assenberg, 268 Fed.Appx. at 643 (“Requiring public housing authorities to violate federal law would not be reasonable”). For similar reasons, courts have been unwilling even to require employers to modify their drug-testing and termination policies to allow *off-site* use of marijuana in states authorizing medical marijuana use. See, e.g., *Ross v. Ragingwire Telecommunications, Inc.,* 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 803, 808 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (stating that “[i]t is not reasonable to require an employer to accommodate a disability by allowing an employee’s drug use when such use is illegal.”). Because they would require that

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13 See 42 U.S.C. § 13661 (requiring PHAs or owners to establish admission standards that “prohibit admission to . . . federally assisted housing for any household with a member who the [PHA] or owner determines is illegally using a controlled substance . . . .”); 24 C.F.R. § 5.854 (same as applied to federally assisted housing); 24 C.F.R. § 960.204 (same as applied to public housing).

14 See 42 U.S.C. § 13662 (requiring PHAs or owners to establish standards that “allow the agency or owner . . . to terminate the tenancy or assistance for any household with a member . . . who the [PHA] or owner determines is illegally using a controlled substance . . . .”); 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6) (requiring public housing leases to state that “any drug-related criminal activity on or off such premises, engaged in by a public housing tenant, any member of the tenant’s household, or any guest or other person under the tenant’s control, shall be cause for termination of tenancy.”); 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(f)(5)(i)(B) (same).

15 See 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(f)(12)(i)(B) (requiring lease to provide that tenant is obligated to assure that no tenant, member of the household, or guest engages in drug-related criminal activity on or off premises); 24 C.F.R. § 5.858 (same as applied to all federally assisted housing).
PHAs and owners condone illegal drug use and would undermine the long-standing programmatic goal of providing a safe living environment free from illegal drug use, accommodations allowing marijuana-related activity constitute a fundamental alteration in the nature of the PHA or owner’s operations and are therefore not reasonable.

2. Other marijuana-related conduct that is not reasonable

The CSA prohibits not only the use of marijuana, but also its manufacture, possession, and distribution, regardless of state medical marijuana laws. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1); 844(a). The drug-free policy to which PHAs and owners must adhere, as expressed in the mandatory lease terms described above, requires that PHAs and owners have the discretion to evict tenants for “any drug-related criminal activity on or off such premises.” Supra note 14. Tenants likewise must refrain from engaging in drug-related criminal activity. Supra note 15. As a result, mandatory drug-free policies prohibit all forms of “drug-related criminal activity,” including the possession, cultivation, and distribution of marijuana. See 24 C.F.R. §§ 966.2 and 5.100 (defining “drug-related criminal activity” in relation to the CSA). Consequently, just as accommodations allowing the use of medical marijuana are not reasonable, accommodations allowing other marijuana-related conduct prohibited by the CSA are also not reasonable.

IV. In the unlikely event that state nondiscrimination laws are construed so as to require PHAs and owners to permit medical marijuana use as a reasonable accommodation, those laws would be subject to preemption by federal law.

Because PHAs and owners are also bound by the laws of the state in which they operate, medical marijuana users might attempt to avail themselves of the reasonable accommodation provisions found in state nondiscrimination laws. Some state nondiscrimination statutes do not have explicit provisions excluding current illegal drug users from their definitions of “disability.” Furthermore, while some states do exclude current illegal drug users from protection, they may not consider behavior that complies with state law, such as the state-authorized use of medical marijuana, to be illegal drug use.

We nonetheless believe it is unlikely that state nondiscrimination laws would be interpreted to require PHAs and owners of federally assisted housing to permit the use of federally-prohibited drugs. For example, the Supreme Court of California held that an otherwise disabled plaintiff failed to state a cause of action under a state nondiscrimination law when he alleged that his employer had unlawfully discharged him because of his off-site medical marijuana use. See Ross v. Ragingwire Telecommunications, Inc., 42 Cal. 4th 920, 924 (Cal. 2008). The court reasoned, in part, that because employers have a legitimate interest in considering the use of federally-illicit drugs when making employment decisions, the employer had no duty to accommodate the plaintiff’s medical marijuana use: “[California law] does not require employers to accommodate the use of illegal drugs. The point is perhaps too obvious to have generated appellate litigation . . . .” Id. at 926.

If a state nondiscrimination law were construed to require accommodations allowing for the use of medical marijuana, such an interpretation would be subject to preemption by the federal laws
governing drug use in public housing and other federally assisted housing, and by the CSA. The CSA expressly preempts state laws that “positively conflict” with the CSA. See 21 U.S.C. § 903. A state law that would require accommodation of medical marijuana use “positively conflicts” with the CSA because it would mandate the very conduct the CSA proscribes. See 21 U.S.C. § 903; 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); 844(a) (criminalizing marijuana-related conduct); United States v. Cannabis Cultivators Club, 5 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1100 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (interpreting the “positive conflict” language in the CSA to preempt state laws that “purport to make legal any conduct prohibited by federal law”); see also Columbia v. Washburn Products, Inc., 134 P.3d 161, 166-67 (Or. 2006) (Kistler, J., concurring) (concluding, in state employment discrimination case involving the use of medical marijuana, that “the federal prohibition on possession is inconsistent with the state requirement that defendant accommodate its use . . . . The fact that the state may choose to exempt medical marijuana users from the reach of state criminal law does not mean that the state can affirmatively require employers to accommodate what federal law specifically prohibits.”).

Although federal laws governing public housing and federally assisted housing do not expressly state an intention to preempt state law, a state law interpreted to require accommodation of medical marijuana use would nonetheless be subject to preemption under the doctrine of implied conflict preemption. Implied conflict preemption arises where “compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility,” or where state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt., 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992) (internal citations and quotations omitted). State nondiscrimination laws requiring accommodation of medical marijuana use would be subject to preemption by federal laws governing drug use in public housing and other federally assisted housing because: 1) by requiring an accommodation when federal admissions standards mandate the exclusion of the applicant, they would render compliance with federal law impossible; and 2) by requiring an accommodation that divests PHAs and owners of the discretion to evict provided by QHWRA and HUD regulations, they would stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of federal law objectives. See supra Section II.C. and notes 13-14.

V. Conclusion

In sum, PHAs and owners may not grant reasonable accommodations that would allow tenants to grow, use, otherwise possess, or distribute medical marijuana, even if in doing so such tenants are complying with state laws authorizing medical marijuana-related conduct. Further, PHAs and owners must deny admission to those applicant households with individuals who are, at the time of consideration for admission, using medical marijuana. See 42 U.S.C. § 13661(b)(1)(A); Laster Memorandum at 2.

We note, however, that PHAs and owners have statutorily-authorized discretion with respect to evicting or refraining from evicting current residents on account of their use of medical marijuana. See 42 U.S.C. § 13662(a)(1); Laster Memorandum at 5-7. If a PHA or owner desires to allow a resident who is currently using medical marijuana to remain as an occupant, the PHA or owner may do so as an exercise of that discretion, but not as a reasonable accommodation. HUD regulations provide factors that PHAs and owners may consider when determining how to exercise their discretion to terminate tenancies because
of current illegal drug use. See 24 C.F.R. §§ 966.4(l)(5)(vii)(B) (factors for PHAs); 5.852 (factors for PHAs and owners operating other assisted housing programs).
MEMORANDUM FOR: William C. Appar, Assistant Secretary, Office of Housing/Federal Housing Commissioner, H

                        Harold Lucas, Assistant Secretary, Office of Public and Indian Housing, P

FROM: James E. Easter, General Counsel, G

SUBJECT: Medical use of marijuana in public housing

The Office of Housing requested our opinion with respect to whether a section 8 tenant's use of medical marijuana requires an owner to terminate the tenancy of the medical marijuana user. It further inquired whether the cost of medical marijuana is deductible for purposes of determining adjusted income under applicable section 8 regulations. Several HUD Field Offices have also requested guidance on this matter. Because these issues are also relevant to the public housing program and the section 8 programs operated by the Office of Public and Indian Housing, this memorandum is also addressed to that office. As more fully articulated below, we conclude that State laws purporting to legalize medical marijuana directly conflict with the admission and occupancy requirements of the Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998 ("Public Housing Reform Act") and are thus subject to preemption.

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1 The term "medical marijuana" in this memorandum means marijuana which, when prescribed by a physician to treat a serious illness such as AIDS, cancer, or glaucoma, is legal under State law.

2 These issues arose in the wake of Washington State's November 3, 1998 referendum in which voters approved the medical use of marijuana. According to the Office of National Drug Control Policy ("ONDCP"), the following States have enacted laws purporting to legalize medical marijuana to date: Alaska, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Nevada, Oregon, Vermont, Virginia, and Washington and, depending on the interpretation of the law in Louisiana, may also be legal there under certain circumstances. See ONDCP's web page, "Status of State Marijuana Initiatives" (copy attached).

3 The Public Housing Reform Act amended the United States Housing Act of 1937 ("Act"), 42 U.S.C. § 1437. As more fully discussed below, it also contains four freestanding sections, sections 576
I. Admission Standards

Section 576(b)(1) of the Public Housing Reform Act requires public housing agencies ("PHAs") and owners to establish standards that:

**prohibit** admission to . . . federally assisted housing for any household with a member--
(A) who the public housing agency or owner determines is illegally using a controlled substance; or
(B) with respect to whom the public housing agency or owner determines that it has reasonable cause to believe that such a household member's illegal use (or pattern of illegal use) of a controlled substance . . . may interfere with the health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other residents.

42 U.S.C. §13661(b)(1) (emphasis added). We interpret the word "prohibit" in this context to mean that the admission standards which the statute prescribes require that PHAs and owners must deny admission to the first class of households, i.e., those with a member who the PHA or owner determines is, at the time of consideration for admission, illegally using a controlled substance. See 64 Fed. Reg. 40252, 40270 (1999) (to be

through 579, which apply across the board to all federally assisted housing. Three of these four sections, section 576 ("Screening of Applicants for Federally Assisted Housing"), section 577 ("Termination of Tenancy and Assistance for Illegal Drug Users and Alcohol Abusers in Federally Assisted Housing"), and section 579 ("Definitions"), govern the questions articulated above. They are codified in Chapter 135 ("Residency and Service Requirements in Federally Assisted Housing") of Title 42 of the United States Code, 42 U.S.C. §§ 13661, 13662, & 13664, rather than with the Act itself.

None of the three applicable freestanding provisions identified in footnote 3 contains a definition of "controlled substance." Section 579(a)(1) of the Public Housing Reform Act, however, attributes the related phrase, "drug-related criminal activity," with the meaning specified in section 3(b) of the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 13664(a)(1). Section 3(b)(9) of the Act defines "drug-related criminal activity" as "the illegal manufacture, sale, distribution, use, or possession with intent to manufacture, sell, distribute, or use, of a controlled substance (as such term is identified in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act.)" 42 U.S.C. § 1437b(9). The Controlled Substances Act in turn
With respect to the determination as to whether a person is illegally using a controlled substance, the Act does not indicate a minimum length of time that must have transpired since the last illegal use of a controlled substance for an applicant to be deemed eligible to receive Federal assistance. Legislative history to the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), which similarly excludes "current users of illegal drugs" from its protections, indicates that in excluding such persons from coverage, Congress intended to exclude persons "whose illegal use of drugs occurred recently enough to justify a reasonable belief that a person's drug use is current."

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 101-596, at 64, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 573. See also, D'Amico v. City of New York, 955 F. Supp. 294, 298 (S.D. N.Y. 1997) (Rehabilitation Act's prohibition against current illegal use of controlled substances encompasses illegal uses occurring recently enough to justify reasonable belief that illegal drug use is current), aff'd 132 F.3d 145 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 2075 (1998). We thus interpret the Public Housing Reform Act's prohibitions against "current" illegal use of a controlled substance as encompassing uses occurring recently enough to warrant a reasonable belief that the use is ongoing.

The courts of appeal which have addressed this issue in cases brought under Federal civil rights statutes have reached different conclusions regarding the length of time that must have passed since the last instance of illegal use for a person not to be considered a "current" illegal user. Most agree, however, that the issue of whether or not a person is a "current" illegal user under Federal civil rights laws requires a highly individualized, fact-specific examination of all relevant circumstances. See, e.g., Shafer v. Preston Memorial Hospital, 107 F.3d 274, 278 (4th Cir. 1997) (employee whose last illegal use of drugs occurred three weeks prior to termination held to be "currently engaging in the illegal use of drugs" under ADA); Collins v. Longview Fibre Co., 63 F.3d 828, 833 (9th Cir. 1995) (passage of "months" between last illegal use of controlled

defines "controlled substance" as "a drug or other substance, or immediate precursor, included in schedule I, II, III, IV, or V of part B of this subchapter." 42 U.S.C. § 802(6). Schedule I includes marijuana. 21 U.S.C. § 812(c) (Schedule I) (c)(10). We therefore attribute the latter definition of "controlled substance" to that phrase, as used in sections 576 and 577 of the Public Housing Reform Act. Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 484 (1990) ("identical words used in different parts of the same Act are intended to have the same meaning") (quoting Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U.S. 84, 87 (1934)).
substance and termination held insufficient for employees to escape classification of current illegal users under ACA); United States v. Southern Management Corp., 955 F.2d 911, 918 (4th Cir. 1992) (persons drug-free for one year held not "current" users under Fair Housing Act). In any event, it is likely that when issues arise with respect to medical marijuana, the person in question will be currently using the controlled substance.

With respect to the second class of households addressed in section 576(b)(1)(B), i.e., those including a member for whom the PHA or owner determines that reasonable cause exists to believe that the member's pattern of illegal use of a controlled substance may interfere with other residents' health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment, section 576(b)(2) of the Public Housing Reform Act affords PHAs and owners limited discretion to admit such households. That section provides as follows:

Consideration of Rehabilitation.--In determining whether, pursuant to paragraph (1)(B), to deny admission to the program or federally assisted housing to any household based on a pattern of illegal use of a controlled substance or a pattern of abuse of alcohol by a household member, a public housing agency or an owner may consider whether such household member--

(A) has successfully completed a supervised drug or alcohol rehabilitation program (as applicable) and is no longer engaging in the illegal use of a controlled substance or abuse of alcohol (as applicable);

(B) has otherwise been rehabilitated successfully and is no longer engaging in the illegal use of a controlled substance or abuse of alcohol (as applicable); or

(C) is participating in a supervised drug or alcohol rehabilitation program (as applicable) and is no longer engaging in the illegal use of a controlled substance or abuse of alcohol (as applicable).

Section 576(b)(1)(B) of the Public Housing Reform Act does not expressly limit the reasonable cause determination to past illegal use or a past and noncontinuing pattern of illegal use, of a controlled substance. But given section 576(b)(1)(A)'s prohibition against admitting any household with a member who the PHA or owner determines is illegally using a controlled substance, i.e., at the time of consideration for admission or recently enough to warrant a reasonable belief that a household member's illegal use is ongoing, we interpret section 576(b)(1)(B) to require PHAs and owners to deny admission to households based on a reasonable cause determination that the household member's past illegal use or past and noncontinuing pattern of illegal use of a controlled substance may interfere with other residents' health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises. 42 U.S.C. § 13661(b)(1)(B).
alcohol rehabilitation program (as applicable) and is no longer engaging in the illegal use of a controlled substance or abuse of alcohol (as applicable).

42 U.S.C. § 13651(b)(2). A PHA or owner may admit such a household under this provision after having determined that both conditions in one of the three considerations enumerated above have been met, i.e., some evidence of drug rehabilitation and no current illegal use. See 64 Fed. Reg. at 40270 (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. § 5.860(a)). As with households including a member who the PHA or owner determines is illegally using a controlled substance, a PHA or owner may admit a household under section 576(b)(1)(B) on the condition that the household member for whom reasonable cause exists to believe that such person's past and noncontinuing illegal use may interfere with other residents' health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment, may not reside with the household or on the premises. 64 Fed. Reg. at 40270 (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. § 5.860(b)).

The law of preemption provides that "it is not necessary for a federal statute to provide explicitly that particular state laws are preempted." Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985). Moreover, a State statute "is invalid to the extent that it "actually conflicts with a . . . federal statute."" International Paper Co. v. Cuyette, 479 U.S. 481, 492 (1987) (quoting Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 158 (1978). "Such a conflict will be found when the state law 'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.'" Cuyette, 479 U.S. at 492 (quoting Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 713).

It is our opinion that State statutes which purport to legalize marijuana stand as such an obstacle to the accomplishment of the purpose of section 576(b)(1) of the Public Housing Reform Act, i.e., to require owners of federally assisted housing to "establish standards that prohibit admission to federally assisted housing" for the two categories of households identified in section 576(b)(1). To the degree that a PHA may look to these State laws for authorization to admit families with a member who is using medical marijuana on the grounds that under State law the use of medical marijuana is not the illegal use of a controlled substance, we believe that the PHA would not be in compliance with section 576. We therefore conclude, with regard to required standards prohibiting admission to federally assisted housing of households with members who are illegally using a controlled substance, that State medical marijuana statutes which purport to remove medical marijuana from classification as a controlled substance are preempted by section 576 of the Public Housing Reform Act.
11. Termination of Tenancy and Assistance

With regard to existing public housing tenants and program participants, section 577(a) of the Public Housing Reform Act requires that PHAs and owners:

establish standards or lease provisions for
continued assistance or occupancy in federally
assisted housing that allow the agency or owner to terminate the tenancy or assistance for any household with a member—

1. who the public housing agency or owner determines is illegally using a controlled substance; or
2. whose illegal use (or pattern of illegal use) of a controlled substance is determined by the [PHA] or owner to interfere with the health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other residents.

42 U.S.C. § 13662(a) (emphasis added). Unlike the prescribed admission standards, which "prohibit" admission of households identified in section 576(b)(1), the prescribed continued occupancy and assistance standards merely "allow" termination when a PHA or owner determines that a household member is illegally using a controlled substance or when a household member displays a past and noncontinuing pattern of illegal use which is determined by the PHA or owner to interfere with other residents' health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment. See 64 Fed. Reg. at 40274 (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. § 882.518(b)(1)(i)).

As discussed above, with respect to the classification of medical marijuana, Federal law preempts any discretion on the part of the PHA or owner from determining that medical marijuana is not a controlled substance. Therefore, an owner or PHA could not make a determination that use of medical marijuana per se is never grounds for termination of tenancy or assistance. And, consequently, could not establish standards or lease provisions that generally permit occupancy of Federally assisted housing by medical marijuana users.

That being said, the statute provides the PHA and the owner with the discretion to determine on a case-by-case basis when it is appropriate to terminate the tenancy or assistance of a household. The propriety of any decision to evict a household or to terminate assistance for past or current illegal use of a controlled substance, or for a stated or demonstrated intent by a resident prospectively to use medical marijuana, requires a highly individualized, fact-specific analysis that is tailored to the relevant circumstances of each case. See Southern Management Corp., 955 F.2d at 918; Forristal v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 933 (4th
Cir. 1986) (decided under Rehabilitation Act). It is therefore not practicable to articulate specific guidance which is relevant to all cases where a PHA is considering eviction or termination of assistance for past or current illegal use of a controlled substance or for a resident's stated or demonstrated intent prospectively to use medical marijuana.

In determining how to exercise the discretion which section 577 of the Public Housing Reform Act affords, however, PHAs and owners should be guided by the fact that historically, HUD has not extensively regulated the area of eviction and termination of assistance, leaving the ultimate determination of whether to evict or terminate assistance to their reasoned discretion. HUD intends that PHAs and owners utilize their discretion under section 577 to make consistent and reasoned determinations with respect to eviction and termination of assistance determinations. In cases where a household member states or demonstrates an intent prospectively to use medical marijuana, PHAs and owners should consider all relevant factors in determining whether to terminate the tenancy or assistance, including, but not necessarily limited to: (1) the physical condition of the medical marijuana user; (2) the extent to which the medical marijuana user has other housing alternatives, if evicted or if assistance were terminated; and (3) the extent to which the PHA or owner would benefit from enforcing lease provisions prohibiting the illegal use of controlled substances.

For households with a member who a PHA or owner determines to be illegally using a controlled substance or whose past and noncontinuing pattern of illegal use of a controlled substance is determined by the PHA or owner to interfere with other residents' health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment, the prescribed continued occupancy and assistance standards, like the prescribed admissions standards, must allow the PHA or owner to consider evidence of successful rehabilitation or current participation in a supervised drug rehabilitation program when determining whether to terminate tenancy or assistance to such a household. Section 577(b).

Again as discussed above with respect to section 576, State statutes which purport to legalize medical marijuana directly conflict with the quoted provisions of section 577 of the Public Housing Reform Act insofar as they purport to remove marijuana, when used pursuant to a physician's prescription, from the Controlled Substances Act's list of controlled substances. The limited discretion which section 577 affords PHAs and owners to refrain from terminating the tenancy of or assistance for illegal drug use, however, does not include any discretion to determine that marijuana is not a controlled substance within the meaning of the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1)(c), even if a State statute purports to legalize its use for medical purposes.
If enforced, such laws would "stand[] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress" in enacting section 577 of the Public Housing Reform Act, i.e., to require that PHAs and owners "establish standards which allow them to terminate the tenancy or assistance" for either class of households identified in section 577(a).

Quellette, 473 U.S. at 492 (quoting Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 713). If given effect, such laws would operate to divest PHAs and owners of the discretion which Congress intended them to have regarding termination of tenancy or assistance for use of a controlled substance. We thus conclude that State medical marijuana statutes, insofar as they may be interpreted to mean that use of medical marijuana is not the illegal use of a controlled substance, are preempted by section 577 of the Public Housing Reform Act.

III. Conclusion

Based on this analysis, we conclude that PHAs and owners must establish standards that require denial of admission to households with a member whom the PHA or owner determines to be illegally using a controlled substance, or for whom it determines that reasonable cause exists to believe that a household member's pattern of illegal use of a controlled substance may interfere with other residents' health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment. Section 576(b). The Public Housing Reform Act affords PHAs and owners limited discretion to admit households with a member for whom such a reasonable cause determination is made in the face of evidence of rehabilitation. Section 576(b)(2). HUD's proposed rule would further allow a PHA or owner to impose as a condition to admission a requirement that "any household member who engaged in or is culpable for the drug use . . . may not reside with the household or on the premises." 64 Fed. Reg. at 40270 (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. § 5.350(b)). Because State medical marijuana laws, insofar as they may be interpreted to mean that use of medical marijuana is not the illegal use of a controlled substance, directly conflict with the objective of the Public Housing Reform Act's requirements regarding admissions, they are preempted.

We further conclude that PHAs and owners must establish standards or lease provisions for continued assistance or occupancy which allow termination of tenancy or assistance for any household with a member who the PHA or owners determines to be illegally using a controlled substance or whose past and noncontinuing pattern of illegal use of a controlled substance is determined by the PHA or owner to interfere with other residents' health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment. The Public Housing Reform Act affords PHAs and owners limited discretion to refrain from terminating the tenancy or assistance for any household with a member for whom such a determination is made in the face of evidence of rehabilitation. Section 577(b). HUD's
proposed rule would further allow a PHA or owner to impose as a condition for continued assistance a requirement that "any household member who engaged in or is culpable for the drug use . . . may not reside with the household or on the premises." 64 Fed. Reg. at 40270 (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. § 5.860(b)).

The standards which section 577 requires must also allow PHAs and owners to terminate the tenancy of or assistance to a household with a member who states or demonstrates an intent prospectively to use medical marijuana. In determining whether to exercise their discretion to evict or terminate assistance for such a household, PHAs and owners should consider all relevant factors particular to each case, including, but not necessarily limited to: (1) the physical condition of the medical marijuana user; (2) the extent to which the medical marijuana user has other housing alternatives, if evicted or if assistance were terminated; and (3) the extent to which the PHA or owner would benefit from enforcing lease provisions that prohibit illegal use of controlled substances.

With regard to the Office of Housing’s question concerning the deductibility of the cost of medical marijuana, the Internal Revenue Service has already concluded, based on the premise that marijuana is a Federally controlled substance for which there are no legal uses, that the cost of medical marijuana is not a deductible medical expense. Rev. Ruling 97-9, 1997-9 I.R.B. 4, 1997 WL 61544 (I.R.S.). While for the purposes of HUD’s assisted housing programs, PHAs and owners are not technically bound by the IRS Revenue Ruling, consistent with the conclusions in this memorandum, we believe that PHAs and owners should be advised that they may not allow the cost of medical marijuana to be considered a deductible medical expense.
Memo

Date: May 21, 2012

To: Jill Duson, Compliance Manager

From: John P. Gause, Commission Counsel

Re: Advisory Opinion – Tenant Request to Smoke Medical Marijuana in Apartment as Reasonable Accommodation

Pursuant to Procedural Rule §2.12(A), a Landlord has asked whether it must allow a Tenant to smoke medical marijuana in an apartment as a “reasonable accommodation” under the Maine Human Rights Act (“MHRA”). Landlord’s lease forbids smoking in the apartment due to public health, fire safety, and cleanliness. It also contains statements that its tenants shall not commit, nor permit to be committed, any violation of local, state, or federal law, including illegal drug use. Tenant has not yet disclosed the nature of his disability. Landlord asks the following questions:

1) May Landlord inquire as to the nature of the disability?

2) If Tenant cannot produce a doctor’s note, can Landlord enforce the provisions of the lease against Tenant if Tenant tries to smoke in the apartment?

3) If Tenant does produce a doctor’s note, may Landlord enforce the provisions of the lease against Tenant if Tenant tries to smoke in the apartment?
4) Basically, is allowing Tenant to smoke marijuana in derogation of the lease and federal law considered a reasonable accommodation that a landlord must permit to avoid running afoul of the law?

The MHRA provides that it is unlawful housing discrimination for a landlord “to refuse to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices or services when those accommodations are necessary to give a person with physical or mental disability equal opportunity to use and enjoy the housing.” 5 M.R.S. §4582-A. To establish a prima-facie case of failure to accommodate, a complainant must show that:

(1) He has a “physical or mental disability” as defined by the MHRA;
(2) Respondent knew or reasonably should have known of the complainant's disability;
(3) Complainant requested a particular accommodation;
(4) The requested accommodation is necessary to afford complainant an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the housing;
(5) The requested accommodation is reasonable on its face, meaning it is both efficacious and proportional to the costs to implement it; and
(6) Respondent refused to make the requested accommodation.

See 5 M.R.S.A. § 4582-A(2); Astralis Condominium Ass'n v. Secretary, U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban Development, 620 F.3d 62, 67 (1st Cir. 2010) (interpreting Fair Housing Act, but seemingly placing overall burden on Complainant to show accommodation was reasonable); Oconomowoc Residential Programs v. City of Milwaukee, 300 F.3d 775, 783 (7th Cir. 2002) (plaintiff’s burden is only to show reasonableness “on its face”). Compare Reed v. Lepage
Bakeries, Inc., 244 F.3d 254, 259 (1st Cir. 2001) (interpreting ADA) (holding that plaintiff need only show requested accommodation was feasible “on the face of things”).

Here, assuming Tenant does not have an obvious disability that justifies smoking medical marijuana, Landlord “may request reliable disability-related information that (1) is necessary to verify that the person meets the [MHRA, 5 M.R.S. §4553-A,] definition of disability . . . (2) describes the needed accommodation, and (3) shows the relationship between the person’s disability and the need for the requested accommodation.” Joint Statement of the Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Department of Justice, Reasonable Accommodations Under the Fair Housing Act, ¶ 18, May 17, 2004. The type of documentation that may permissibly be requested will vary depending on the circumstances. Id. If Tenant does not show that smoking medical marijuana in his apartment is necessary for him to “use and enjoy the housing” in light of a “physical or mental disability,” Landlord would not be obligated to provide the requested accommodation.

If Tenant does make that showing, he also must show that smoking medical marijuana in his apartment is reasonable “on its face.” Oconomowoc Residential Programs, 300 F.3d at 783-784. With respect to the no-smoking policy, while Landlord has a defense based on that policy that will be discussed below, there is nothing unreasonable “on its face” about requesting a deviation from that policy. With respect to the policy prohibiting illegal activity, if medical marijuana were illegal under both federal and state law, a much stronger case could be made that it is facially unreasonable to require a landlord to allow a tenant to deviate from such a policy. See In re Moore, 2010 WL 1542524, *6 (N.Y.Sup. 2010) (holding that defendant “is not required to provide petitioner with an accommodation that allows her to engage in illegal activities”). Cf.
Despears v. Milwaukee County, 63 F.3d 635, 637 (7th Cir. 1995) (“It is true that the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act require the employer to make a reasonable accommodation of an employee's disability, but we do not think it is a reasonably required accommodation to overlook infractions of law.”); Taub v. Frank, 957 F.2d 8, 11 (1st Cir. 1992) (Postal Service employee convicted of possession and distribution of heroin was not “qualified handicapped person” under the federal Rehabilitation Act).

The issue is complicated here, however, because the State of Maine specifically allows the possession and use of medical marijuana. Pursuant to the Maine Medical Use of Marijuana Act (“MMUMA”), 22 M.R.S. §§2421, et seq., a “qualifying patient” may possess a limited amount of marijuana and “[b]e in the presence or vicinity of the medical use of marijuana.” 22 M.R.S. §2423-A(1)(A), (G). A “qualifying patient” is defined as “a person who has been diagnosed by a physician as having a debilitating medical condition and who possesses a valid written certification regarding medical use of marijuana in accordance with section 2423-B.” 22 M.R.S. §2422(9).

In addition, by delineating the circumstances under which a landlord is not required to allow a tenant to smoke medical marijuana in an apartment, the MMUMA appears to contemplate that a landlord will, under other circumstances, be required to permit a tenant to do so. The MMUMA addresses a tenant’s right to use medical marijuana as follows:

2. School, employer or landlord may not discriminate. A school, employer or landlord may not refuse to enroll or employ or lease to or otherwise penalize a person solely for that person's status as a qualifying patient or a primary caregiver unless failing to do so would put the school, employer or landlord in violation of federal law or cause it to lose a federal contract or funding. This subsection does not prohibit a restriction on the administration or cultivation of marijuana on premises when that administration or cultivation would be inconsistent with the general use of the premises. A landlord or business owner may prohibit the
smoking of marijuana for medical purposes on the premises of the landlord or business if the landlord or business owner prohibits all smoking on the premises and posts notice to that effect on the premises.

22 M.R.S. §2423-E(2) (emphasis added). Compare Ross v. RagingWire Telecommunications, Inc., 174 P.3d 200, 204 (Cal. 2008) (holding that the California Fair Employment and Housing Act does not require employers to accommodate the use of illegal drugs while noting that the California medical marijuana law does not address employment discrimination).

Finally, although possession of all marijuana is illegal under federal law, 21 U.S.C. §§844(a)(1), 844a(a), the United States Department of Justice has discouraged the United States Attorneys from enforcing this law against people who use medical marijuana in compliance with state law. Memorandum of Selected United States Attorneys, David W. Ogden, Deputy Attorney General, October 19, 2009, available online at http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/medical-marijuana.pdf.

In light of all of these factors, it is reasonable “on its face” for a landlord to allow a tenant to smoke medical marijuana in an apartment notwithstanding a policy prohibiting smoking and illegal activity in an apartment.¹

¹ The United States Department of Housing and Urban Development has issued a memorandum (“HUD Memo”) addressing whether Public Housing Agencies (“PHA”) may grant current or prospective residents a reasonable accommodation under, in part, the Federal Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), 42 U.S.C. §§3601, et seq., and state nondiscrimination laws for the medical use of marijuana when such use is permitted under state law. See Medical Use of Marijuana and Reasonable Accommodation in Federal Public and Assisted Housing, Helen R. Kanovsky, Office of General Counsel, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, January 20, 2011. HUD concluded that the FHA and state law may not be used to permit such accommodations. With respect to the FHA, HUD concluded that such an accommodation would not be “reasonable” because it would sanction violations of federal criminal law and thus constitute a fundamental alteration in the nature of the PHA housing program. HUD Memo at 8-9. The question here, however, relates to a private landlord, not a PHA, and PHAs are subject to a statutory scheme that does not apply to private landlords. In addition, with respect to state nondiscrimination laws, HUD concluded, in part, that they would be preempted by the federal Controlled Substances Act if they were interpreted to require landlords to allow tenants to use medical marijuana. HUD Memo at 9-10. Specifically, the HUD Memo concludes that “[a] state law that would require medical marijuana use would ‘positively conflict’ with the CSA because it would mandate the very
That does not mean, however, that Landlord is required to permit Tenant to smoke medical marijuana in the apartment. After a complainant has established a prima-facie case, respondent may refuse to provide a requested accommodation if it can show that the requested accommodation “imposes undue financial or administrative burdens or requires a fundamental alteration in the nature of the program.” *Oconomowoc Residential Programs*, 300 F.3d at 784. In addition, a landlord is free to “set up and enforce specifications in the selling, renting, leasing or letting or in the furnishings of facilities or services in connection with the facilities that are consistent with business necessity and are not based on the . . . physical or mental disability [of a] tenant . . ..” 5 M.R.S. §4583.

Here, Landlord is likely to establish at least the latter defense through its strict policy of prohibiting smoking in its apartments. Again, Landlord’s lease forbids smoking in the apartment due to public health, fire safety, and cleanliness. Assuming Landlord enforces this lease provision against all of its tenants, not just tenants with “physical or mental disabilities” who smoke medical marijuana, such a lease provision would be “consistent with business necessity” and not “based on the physical or mental disability” of the tenant. *See* 5 M.R.S. §4583. A specification is “consistent with business necessity” if it is shown by objective evidence to be closely tailored to serve a legitimate and substantial reason. *See Langlois v. Abington Housing Authority*, 207 F.3d 43, 51 (1st Cir. 2000) (interpreting FHA); Title VIII Complaint Intake, conduct the CSA proscribes.” HUD Memo at 10. The HUD Memo is not persuasive in this regard, however. The Memo cites one provision of the CSA, 21 U.S.C. §841(a)(1), which makes it unlawful “for any person knowingly or intentionally to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance,” and another, 21 U.S.C. §844(a), which criminalizes the simple possession and purchase of controlled substances, but it does not cite any statutory provision that prohibits a person, such as a landlord, from allowing the possession or use of marijuana on premises owned or managed by that person. Thus, while the MMUMA permits conduct by a tenant that is prohibited by the CSA, requiring a landlord to allow a tenant to use medical marijuana is not proscribed by the CSA, and there is no conflict through which the CSA would preempt the MHRA.
Public health, fire safety, and cleanliness are legitimate and substantial concerns of any landlord, and prohibiting smoking in an apartment building is closely tailored to those reasons. Indeed, the MMUMA specifically contemplates that a landlord “may prohibit the smoking of marijuana for medical purposes on the premises of the landlord or business if the landlord or business owner prohibits all smoking on the premises and posts notice to that effect on the premises.” 22 M.R.S. §2423-E(2). Accordingly, Landlord’s no-smoking policy is a sufficient defense under the MHRA, 5 M.R.S. §4583, to tenant’s request for reasonable accommodation.

Landlord’s questions should be answered as follows:

1) May Landlord inquire as to the nature of the disability?

**ANSWER:** Yes, if Tenant does not have an obvious disability that justifies his smoking medical marijuana.

2) If Tenant cannot produce a doctor’s note, may Landlord enforce the provisions of the lease against Tenant if Tenant tries to smoke in the apartment?

**ANSWER:** If Tenant does not provide sufficient information verifying that he meets the MHRA definition of “physical or mental disability” and that smoking medical marijuana in his apartment is necessary to “use and enjoy” his apartment (this may or may not be a “doctor’s note,” depending on the nature of the disability), Landlord may enforce the provisions the lease against Tenant if Tenant tries to
smoke in the apartment.

3) If Tenant does produce a doctor’s note, may Landlord enforce the provisions of
the lease against Tenant if Tenant tries to smoke in the apartment?

**ANSWER:** Yes, provided Landlord prohibits all smoking on the premises and
posts notice to that effect on the premises.

4) Basically, is allowing the tenant to smoke marijuana in derogation of the lease and
federal law considered a reasonable accommodation that a landlord must permit
to avoid running afoul of the law?

**ANSWER:** No, if the landlord prohibits all smoking on the premises and posts
notice to that effect on the premises.

Cc: Amy M. Sneirson, Executive Director